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Abstract—We consider a secure communication scenario
through the two-user Gaussian interference channel: each trans-
mitter (user) has a confidential message to send reliably to
its intended receiver while keeping it secret from the other
receiver. Prior work investigated the performance of two different
approaches for this scenario; i.i.d. Gaussian random codes and
real alignment of structured codes. While the latter achieves the
optimal sum secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.), its extension
to finite SNR regimes is challenging. In this paper, we propose
a new achievability scheme for the weak and the moderately
weak interference regimes, in which the reliability as well as the
confidentiality of the transmitted messages are maintained at any
finite SNR value. Our scheme uses lattice structure, structured
jamming codewords, and lattice alignment in the encoding and
the asymmetric compute-and-forward strategy in the decoding.
We show that our lower bound on the sum secure rates scales
linearly with log(SNR) and hence, it outperforms i.i.d. Gaussian
random codes. Furthermore, we show that our achievable result
is asymptotically optimal. Finally, we provide a discussion on an
extension of our scheme to K > 2 users.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been shown that structured codes along with align-
ment techniques can improve achievability results over i.i.d.
random codes in different secure communication scenarios.
For instance, two schemes based on real alignment of struc-
tured signals were tested on a multi-user Gaussian interference
channel with confidential messages [1], [2]. In [1], a two-user
Gaussian interference channel with no helper was considered,
in which each user had a message for its intended receiver to
be kept confidential from the other receiver. It was shown that
the optimal sum secure degrees of freedom can be achieved
for this channel through cooperative jamming signals and real
alignment [1]. The case with extra nodes serving as helpers
was further investigated at infinite SNR in [1]. Also, the
scheme proposed in [2] attained the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the
K > 2-user Gaussian interference channels with confidential
messages and no helper; it was shown that the optimal s.d.o.f.
for this general case is equal to K(K−1)2K−1 [2].
Although the aforementioned schemes showed promising
performance in the infinite SNR regime, their extension to
the finite SNR regimes is challenging due to the difficulty
in bounding their decoding error probability at a finite SNR
value. In this work, we consider the two-user Gaussian in-
terference channel with no helper in which each transmitter
wishes to send a message to its intended receiver while keeping
it confidential from the other receiver. For this scenario, we
offer an achievability scheme that combines the idea of using
cooperative jamming with the Han-Kobayashi achievability
scheme [3]. More specifically, in our scheme each trans-
mitter sends out a superposition of lattice codewords, taken
from multiple nested lattice sets. The jamming codewords
are also constructed using a lattice structure. Using careful
alignments, each transmitter helps the other transmitter to keep
its confidential message secret from the unintended receiver.
This implies cooperation between the transmitters without any
connection. To handle the finite SNR regimes, each receiver
applies the compute-and-forward decoding strategy in [4], [5].
We investigate the performance of our scheme for any finite
SNR value (as long as log(SNR) > 0) and whenever the
interference level lies either in the weak or moderately weak
interference regimes. Also, we show that our achievable result
reaches the optimal sum secure degrees of freedom for the
considered model. Moreover, we provide a discussion on the
extension of our scheme to the general case of K > 2 users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we state the considered problem formally. In section III,
we present our achievable results. Section IV provides the
proposed achievability scheme along with the analysis of
security. Section V extends our scheme to the K > 2-user
case. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider the problem of reliable transmission over a
two-user interference channel in which each transmitter has a
confidential message to send to one intended receiver while
keeping it secret from the other receiver. The relationships
among channel inputs and outputs are described as:
y1 = h11x1 + h21x2 + z1 (1)
y2 = h22x2 + h12x1 + z2 (2)
where xℓ is transmitter ℓ’s channel input with length N , and yℓ
is the channel output at receiver ℓ, for ℓ = 1, 2. The real-valued
hℓℓ is the channel gain from user ℓ to its respective receiver
(the direct link gain) and the real-valued hℓj , for j = 1, 2
and j 6= ℓ, is the cross link gain (the leakage link gain). We
assume that the transmitters1 know the channel states, i.e., the
channel gains, in advance. Finally, the random vector zℓ is an
independent channel noise, which is i.i.d. Gaussian with zero
mean and normalized variance.
Transmitter ℓ has an independent confidential message
Wℓ, uniformly distributed over the set {1, . . . , 2NRℓ}, for
1In our scheme, knowledge of the channel state is not beneficial either to
the receiver or to the eavesdropper.
W1 E1 +
z1
D1 Wˆ1 W2
x1 h11 y1
W2 E2 +
z2
D2 Wˆ2 W1
x2 h22 y2
h12
h21
Fig. 1: The two-user Gaussian interference channel model with
confidential messages.
ℓ ∈ {1, 2}. Transmitter ℓ maps its message to codeword
xℓ through a stochastic encoder, i.e., xℓ = Eℓ(Wℓ). More-
over, there is a power constraint on the channel input as
‖xℓ‖2 ≤ NP , for ℓ = 1, 2. At receiver ℓ, decoderDℓ estimates
the respective transmitted message as Wˆℓ = Dℓ(yℓ). Figure 1
illustrates the communication model.
Definition 1 (Achievable secure rates): For the two-user
Gaussian interference channel with independent confidential
messages, a non-negative rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable, if
for any ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large N , there exist encoders
{Eℓ}2ℓ=1 and decoders {Dℓ}2ℓ=1 such that:
Prob (Dℓ(yℓ) 6= Wℓ) < ǫ ℓ = 1, 2 (3)
R1 ≤ 1
N
H(W1|y2) + ǫ, R2 ≤ 1
N
H(W2|y1) + ǫ (4)
Inequalities in (3) capture the reliability constraints for both
receivers and the constraints in (4) ensure the confidentiality
of each message from the unintended receiver according to the
notion of weak secrecy [6]. The secrecy capacity region is the
supremum over all the achievable secure rate pairs.
Definition 2 (Weak and moderately weak interference regimes):
In our model, the interference to noise ratio (INR) for receivers
1 and 2 is defined as2
INR1 , h
2
21P, INR2 , h
2
12P (5)
Then, the weak interference regime includes all channel gains
such that
1
2
≤
(
log(h221P )
log(h211P )
)
<
2
3
,
1
2
≤
(
log(h212P )
log(h222P )
)
<
2
3
(6)
Furthermore, the moderately weak interference regime in-
cludes all channel gains such that
2
3
≤
(
log(h221P )
log(h211P )
)
< 1,
2
3
≤
(
log(h212P )
log(h222P )
)
< 1 (7)
Note that Definition 2 is aligned with the common notions
of weak and moderately weak interference regimes in the
literature, e.g., as in [4].
2We assume that log(h2
11
P ) > 0 and log(h2
22
P ) > 0 which are consistent
with the assumption that users operate above noise level.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Consider Pt1, Pu1, Pt2, Pu2 as non-negative scalar variables
such that Pt1+
(
h21
h11
)2
Pu1 ≤ P and Pt2+
(
h12
h22
)2
Pu2 ≤ P .
Then, the following theorem provides a lower bound on the
achievable secure rates.
Theorem 1: A rate pair (R1, R2) which satisfies the follow-
ing inequalities is an achievable secure rate pair for the weak
and moderately weak interference regimes.
R1 < R
(1)
comb,2 −
1
2
log
(
Pu2 + Pt1
Pu2
)
(8)
R2 < R
(2)
comb,2 −
1
2
log
(
Pu1 + Pt2
Pu1
)
(9)
In which, R(1)comb,2 is a lower bound on the optimal combi-
nation rate at which transmitter 1’s message can be reliably
decoded by receiver 1 using the asymmetric compute-and-
forward decoding strategy. The achievable combination rate
R
(1)
comb,2 is mathematically computed in (20). The combination
rate R(2)comb,2 is similarly defined for receiver 2. The proof of
Theorem 1 is shown in Section IV.
Corollary 1: The secure rates in (8) and (9) scale linearly
with log(P ).
The proof of Corollary 1 is provided in Section IV.
Corollary 2: The optimal sum secure degrees of freedom
of 23 is achievable using our proposed scheme, i.e.,
lim
P→∞
R1 +R2
1
2 log(1 + P )
=
2
3
(10)
The achievability proof of Corollary 2 is deduced by applying
Corollary 5 in [4] to R(1)comb,2 and R
(2)
comb,2 and the fact that
the second terms in (8) and (9) are constant with respect to
power P . Also, the upper bound was shown in [1].
Remark 1: Recall that the performance of i.i.d. Gaussian
random codes was investigated in [7] under three different
schemes including time-sharing, multiplexed transmission, and
incorporation of artificial noise. According to the results in [7],
i.i.d. Gaussian random codes achieve zero sum secure degrees
of freedom for the two-user Gaussian interference channel in
all the three schemes.
IV. ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME
We begin the achievabiliy proof of Theorem 1 by describing
our codebook construction, encoding, decoding strategies, and
analysis of security.
A. Codebook construction
Our codebook construction is motivated by the Han-
Kobayashi scheme in which each user transmits a superpo-
sition of codewords taken from two nested lattice codebooks.
However, the difference here is that the second lattice code-
book is used to encode the jamming signal. Therefore, each
transmitter encodes its message as well as a cooperative jam-
ming signal that masks the other transmitter’s message at the
unintended receiver. We describe the codebook construction
for transmitter 1; transmitter 2 builds its codebook similarly.
The transmitter picks two n-dimensional pairs of coarse and
fine lattice sets (Λt,1,Λt,f,1) and (Λu,1,Λu,f,1). The former
coarse and fine lattice pair, indexed by t, is used for encoding
transmitter’s message and the latter pair indexed by u is used
for encoding the transmitter’s jamming signal. Assume that the
lattice sets chosen by both transmitters form a nested structure
as3
Λ⊆Λt,2⊆Λt,1⊆Λu,2⊆Λu,1⊆Λt,f,2⊆Λt,f,1⊆Λu,f,2⊆Λu,f,1
(11)
We scale the coarse lattice sets such that the sec-
ond moments of Λt,2,Λt,1,Λu,2,Λu,1 are determined by
Pt,2, Pt,1, Pu,2, Pu,1, respectively. We denote the fundamental
Voronoi region of the coarse lattice Λt,1 as Vt,1. The centers
of the cosets of the fine lattice Λt,f,1 are n-length lattice
words which are considered as the realizations of the n-length
random vector t1. Then, the lattice codebook of transmitter
1 is constructed as Lt,1 , {t1|t1 ∈ Vt,1} and is dubbed
as the inner codebook. Assume a probability distribution
P (t1) over the inner codebook Lt,1. Then, transmitter 1
constructs a realization of an N -length random vector t¯1,
where N , n × B, by generating B i.i.d. copies of t1
according to the distribution P (t1). This process is repeated
for 2NR
(1)
comb,2 times. The collection of the generated vectors
are called as the outer codebook and is denoted by Ct,1. Also,
vector t¯1 represents the random vector for the outer lattice
codewords of transmitter 1. Note that R(1)comb,2 ,
1
n
log(|Lt,1|)
is the rate at which the inner codewords of transmitter 1 are
generated.
In addition to the codebooks for the confidential message,
the transmitter constructs an inner codebook Lu,1 and an outer
codebook Cu,1 for the jamming signal, in a similar manner. The
random vector assigned to the jamming inner lattice codewords
is denoted by u1, and u¯1 represents the random vector for the
jamming outer codewords. In the next step, codebook Ct,1 is
randomly partitioned into 2NR1 bins of equal size. The random
variable representing the bin index is denoted by W1 and
its realization w1 takes values from the set {1, . . . , 2NR1}.
Ct,1(w1) is the set of outer codewords belong to bin w1.
Finally, a set of random N -length vectors d¯t,1 and d¯u,1 are
generated for dithering. Assume that each n-length block of
dither d¯t,1 has a uniform distribution over Vt,1, and similarly,
each n-length block of dither d¯u,1 has a uniform distribution
over the corresponding Voronoi region Vu,1. Dithers are public
and hence they don’t add to secrecy. Note that transmitter 2
constructs its codebooks similarly.
B. Encoding
We describe the encoding procedure for transmitter 1; sim-
ilar arguments hold for encoding at transmitter 2. To encode
the confidential message w1, transmitter 1 randomly picks a
codeword t¯1 from the bin set Ct,1(w1). Then, it dithers the
codeword using a randomly generated N -length vector d¯t,1.
The result is reduced to the Voronoi region Vt,1 using the
3Λ is the common coarsest lattice set.
modular operation. Also, u¯1 is chosen at random. We have:
t¯1,d,
[
t¯1+d¯t,1
]
mod Λt,1, u¯1,d,
[
u¯1+d¯u,1
]
mod Λu,1
(12)
Next step in the encoding procedure is scaling the jamming
codeword such that it aligns with the confidential codeword
of transmitter 2 at receiver 1. The superposition of the
confidential codeword with the scaled jamming codeword
is sent through the channel as the transmitter 1 input, i.e.,
x1 = t¯1,d +
h21
h11
u¯1,d. Note that x1 satisfies the channel input
power constraint, thus, Pt1 +
(
h21
h11
)2
Pu1 ≤ P .
C. Decoding
As in the previous steps, we describe the decoding pro-
cedure at receiver 1; receiver 2 acts similarly. The decoding
procedure is based on the asymmetric compute-and-forward
strategy, introduced in [4] and [5]. In our model, receiver 1
observes sequence y1 from the channel as
y1 = h11t¯1,d + h21(t¯2,d + u¯1,d) +
h21h12
h22
u¯2,d + z1 (13)
Assume that the powers of codewords u¯1,d and u¯2,d are set
such that the codewords h12h21
h11
u¯1,d and h21h12h22 u¯2,d are below
the noise power level. As jamming codewords do not carry
useful information about the confidential signals, receiver 1
treats the third term in (13) as noise. Therefore, receiver
1 observes an effective two-user Gaussian multiple-access
channel (GMAC) as y1 = h11t¯1,d + h21(t¯2,d + u¯1,d) + z˜1,
in which z˜1 is the effective noise seen by receiver 1. Now,
let us normalize the noise power to form a standard effective
MAC as in [4]. We have:
y˜1 =
h11√
1 + α21Pu2
t¯1,d +
h21√
1 + α21Pu2
(t¯2,d + u¯1,d) + z˜eff,1
(14)
where z˜eff,1 is the normalized-power effective noise; the
factor α1 is defined as α1 , h12h21h22 ; finally, y˜1 is the scaled
sequence observed at receiver 1.
Consider the effective channel vector, heff,1,
and the power scaling vector, beff,1, defined
as heff,1 ,
(
h11√
1+α21Pu2
, h21√
1+α21Pu2
)T
and
beff,1 ,
(√
Pt1
P
,
√
Pt2+Pu1
P
)T
, respectively. Then,
according to Theorem 7 in [4], the sum of the optimal
combination rates for the above effective two-user GMAC
seen by receiver 1 is lower-bounded as
2∑
ℓ=1
R
(1)
comb,ℓ≥
1
2
log
(
1+P
∑2
ℓ=1h
2
eff,1(ℓ)b
2
eff,1(ℓ)
b2eff,1(1)b
2
eff,1(2)
)
−1
(15)
Next, assume the optimal combination rates for the aforemen-
tioned effective GMAC are sorted in a descending order, i.e.,
R
(1)
comb,1 ≥ R(1)comb,2. Then, based on Theorem 9 in [4], it is
guaranteed that transmitter 1’s confidential message can be
decoded reliably by receiver 1 for all rates not bigger than
R
(1)
comb,2 unless the effective channel gains are rational4. As a
result, it remains to find a lower bound on the achievable rate
R
(1)
comb,2, i.e.,
R
(1)
comb,2 =
2∑
ℓ=1
R
(1)
comb,ℓ −R(1)comb,1 (16)
which is equivalent to finding an upper bound on the achiev-
able rate R(1)comb,1, which maps to the decoding rate of the
aligned codewords t¯2,d + u¯1,d. Therefore, the computation
rate for R(1)comb,1 is given as R
(1)
comb,1 =
1
2 log(Pt2 + Pu1) −
1
2 log(σ
2
eff,1), in which σ2eff,1 is the variance of the effective
noise in the first integer linear combination of the codewords
decoded at receiver 1. Let us denote the first integer linear
combination as v1. Assume it is determined by the integer-
valued 2× 1 vector a1, i.e., v1 , a1(1)(t¯2 + u¯1) + a1(2)t¯1.
Recall that according to the compute-and-forward strategy in
[8], the receiver decodes an estimate of v1 as follows:
s1 =
[
βy˜1 − a1(1)(d¯t,2 + d¯u,1)− a1(2)d¯t,1
]
mod Λ (17)
= [v1 + zeff,1] mod Λ (18)
in which β ∈ R is a scaling factor. To estimate v1 from
(18), the receiver quantizes (18) with respect to the finest
participating lattice, i.e., vˆ , QΛu,f,1 (s1). Note that the
modular operation as well as the quantization are done block-
wise.
To upper-bound the combination rate R(1)comb,1, it is sufficient
to lower bound σ2eff,1; which is computed as
σ2eff,1,
(
β2+P
(
b2eff,1(1)(βheff,1(1)−a1(1))2
+b2eff,1(2)(βheff,1(2)−a1(2))2
))
(19)
Finally, the effective variance is minimized over β and a1
and it is denoted by σ∗2eff,1, i.e., σ∗2eff,1 , minβ,a σ2eff,1. As
a result, a lower bound on the achievable rate R(1)comb,2 is
obtained as
R
(1)
comb,2 ≥
1
2
log
(
1 + h2eff,1(1)Pt1 + h
2
eff,2(2) (Pt2 + Pu1)
)
+log(P )+
1
2
log(σ∗2eff,1)−
1
2
log(Pt1)−log(Pt2+Pu1)−1 (20)
Prior to security analysis, we show that the rates in (8) and
(9) scale with power as it was claimed in Corollary 1.
Proof of Corollary 1: We show that R1 scales linearly with
log(P ); the same result can be shown for R2, using similar
arguments. To this end, let us assume a power allocation
among the users’ jamming powers and confidential-messages
powers as Pt1 = Pt2 = (1 − γ2)P and (h21h11 )2Pu1 =
(h12
h22
)2Pu2 = γ
2P , for some 0 < γ2 < 1. This is a valid
choice as it satisfies the power constraint. Substituting these
power values in (8), we observe that the second term in (8) is
constant with respect to P for any valid choice of γ. Therefore,
it is enough to show that R(1)comb,2 grows linearly with log(P ).
Now assume γ2 = 1
h221P
, which may be a sub-optimal choice.
4The Lebesgue measure of such event is small [4]
The validity of this choice can be checked easily for the weak
and the moderately weak interference regimes. Note that this
choice for γ2 makes the power of the third term in (13) to
be within noise level. Having chosen γ2 as mentioned, we
can compute Pu2, Pt1 accordingly. As a result, we observe
that the first and fourth terms in (20) can be rewritten as
1
2 log(P ) + c1 and
1
2 log(P ) + c2 for some constants (with
respect to P) c1, c2, respectively; additionally, the fifth term
can be simplified as log(P ) + c3 for a constant c3. As a
result, we have R(1)comb,2 ≥ 12 log(σ∗2eff,1) + c1+ c2+ c3. Now,
consider the expression in (19); note that it can be rewritten
as σ2eff,1 = (β
2 + c4(a, β)P ) in which c4(.) is a positive
number. Since the latter holds for any choice of β and integer
coefficient vector a, it is also true for the the infimum and as
a result, log(σ∗2eff,1) ∝ log(P ). This completes the proof of
Corollary 1.
D. Analysis of Security
In this subsection we show that our scheme provides weak
secrecy for each transmitter’s confidential message. Specifi-
cally, we prove weak secrecy for transmitter 1’s confidential
message W1; the proof of weak secrecy for transmitter 2’s
message is deduced similarly. We have
1
N
I(W1;y2)≤ 1
N
I(W1;y2 ,¯t2)=R1− 1
N
H(W1|y2 ,¯t2) (21)
Next, we find a lower bound on the second term in (21) as
follows:
1
N
H(W1|y2, t¯2) = 1
N
H(t¯1,W1|y2, t¯2)− 1
N
H(t¯1|y2, t¯2,W1)
≥ 1
N
H(t¯1|y2, t¯2)− 1
N
H(t¯1|y2, t¯2,W1)
(a)
≥ 1
N
H(t¯1|y2 ,¯t2)−2ǫ2
(b)
≥ 1
N
H(t¯1|y2 ,¯t2,u¯1,z2,D)−2ǫ2 (22)
Inequality (a) is deduced by applying Lemma 1 in [9] to
outer codewords t¯1. Inequality (b) holds since conditioning
reduces entropy. In (22), D denotes the collection of all the
dither vectors. Note that receiver 2 observes y2 = h22t¯2,d +
h12(t¯1,d + u¯2,d) +
h12h21
h11
u¯1,d + z2. Hence, if the receiver 2
had the information of the random vectors D, z2, and t¯2, it
could decode the aligned lattice codeword t¯1,d + u¯2,d. As a
result, based on (22), we have
1
N
H(W1|y2 ,¯t2)≥ 1
N
H(t¯1|t¯1,d+u¯2,d ,¯t2,u¯1,z2,D)−2ǫ2
=
1
N
H
(
t¯1
∣∣∣∣[t¯1,d+u¯2,d] mod Λu,2,QΛu,2(t¯1,d+u¯2,d),¯t2,u¯1,z2,D
)
−2ǫ2
≥ 1
N
H
(
t¯1
∣∣∣∣[t¯1,d+u¯2,d] mod Λu,2 ,¯t2,u¯1,z2,D
)
− 1
N
H(QΛu,2(t¯1,d+u¯2,d)
∣∣t¯2,u¯1,z2,D)−2ǫ2
(a)
=
1
N
H
(
t¯1
∣∣∣∣[t¯1+u¯2] mod Λu,2
)
− 1
N
H
(
QΛu,2(t¯1,d+u¯2,d)
∣∣∣∣t¯2,u¯1,z2,D
)
−2ǫ2
(b)
=
1
N
H(t¯1)− 1
N
H(QΛu,2(t¯1,d+u¯2,d)
∣∣t¯2,u¯1,z2,D)−2ǫ2
≥ 1
N
H(t¯1)− 1
N
H(QΛu,2(t¯1,d+u¯2,d))−2ǫ2
(c)
≥ 1
N
H(t¯1)−1
2
log
(
Pu2+Pt1
Pu2
)
−δ(ǫ)−2ǫ2
=R
(1)
comb,2−
1
2
log
(
Pu2+Pt1
Pu2
)
−δ(ǫ)−2ǫ2 (23)
in which equality (a) is due to the fact that the random vectors
t¯1, u¯2 are independent from the dithers, the noise and random
vectors u¯1, t¯2. Equality (b) follows from Crypto Lemma,
Lemma 2 in [10], which states that the lattice codeword
[t¯1 + u¯2]mod Λu,2 belongs to the codebook Lu,2 (operation
mod is done for each n-length block) and is independent of
codeword t¯1. Finally, inequality (c) is deduced from Lemma
1 in [11], which bounds the discrete entropy of the quantized
vector. Eventually, from (8), (23), and (21), the weak secrecy
proof for transmitter 1’s confidential message is concluded.
V. THE GENERAL CASE: THE GAUSSIAN INTERFERENCE
CHANNEL WITH K > 2 USERS
Our scheme in Section IV can be modified to preserve
the confidentiality of all the messages from the unintended
receivers when there are K > 2 users. Recall that in our
scheme, each jamming signal was designed to protect one
confidential message at one receiver. For the case of K > 2
users, we divide each confidential message into K − 1 in-
dependent random sub-messages and assign each of them a
lattice codebook. For transmitter ℓ, the sub-messages outer
codewords are denoted by {t¯ℓ,i}Ki=1,i6=ℓ; for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Now, each jamming codeword protects a portion of all sub-
messages at all the required receivers simultaneously. For
instance, the jamming codeword of transmitter ℓ, i.e., u¯ℓ con-
ceals all codewords {t¯i,ℓ}Ki=1,i6=ℓ,i6=j at receiver j. However,
this requires that u¯ℓ get aligned with the same codeword at
multiple receiver even though the channel link gains are not
the same for different receivers. As an example, consider the
case of K = 3: u¯1 needs to align with t¯2,1 at receivers 1
and 2; additionally, it should protect t¯3,1 at receivers 1 and 3.
Clearly, perfect alignment would not be achieved given that
channel link gains are not the same. To remedy this alignment
issue, we incorporate a generalization of the asymptotic real
alignment proposed in [12] and used in [2], [13]. Using this
technique, we further split each sub-message inner codeword
into large number of components each of which is an n-
dimensional lattice vector. Next, using a proper beamforming
of the transmitted signals, we can show that a subset of
components of each codeword gets aligned with a subset of
components of a jamming codeword. Hence, even though a
perfect alignment between two desired codewords cannot be
achieved at more than one receiver, a partial alignment among
their corresponding components can occur at all the required
receivers, simultaneously. It can be shown that for a large
number of components, the desired alignments happen at all
the receivers asymptotically. We aim to further elaborate our
scheme for this general case in the extended version of this
paper.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered a reliable and secure com-
munication scenario through the two-user Gaussian interfer-
ence channel when the interference level is either weak or
moderately weak. We showed that our achievable result scales
linearly with log(SNR), when log(SNR) > 0, and reaches
the optimal sum secure degrees of freedom at infinite SNR.
We also argued how our scheme could be extended to the
K > 2-user case.
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